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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Case No. 920492-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,

Priority No. 2

-vsMARK EDWARD McGRATH,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Article VIII,
Section 5 of the Utah Constitution, and by Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992) which permits a defendant in a district
court criminal action to petition the Court of Appeals for reversal
of a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a first
degree or capital felony.

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes, rules and/or constitutional provisions
are determinative or may be determinative of the outcome of this
appeal:

U.C.A. § 77-29-1, (1980, as amended).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether

the

district

court

lacked

jurisdiction

to

prosecute this case because Mr. McGrath was not brought to trial

within 120 days pursuant to Utah Code Ann* § 77-29-1.
STANDARD OF REVIEW.

Since this involves interpretation of a

statute, no deference should be given to the trial court, The
matter should be reviewed de novo.
2.

Whether Mr. McGrath's conviction should be reversed

because it is not supported by sufficient evidence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW. All the evidence and the inferences which
may be reasonably drawn therefrom will be construed in the light
most favorable to the verdict.
3.

Whether Mr. McGrath's conviction should be reversed

because his right to a fair trial was seriously prejudiced by
extensive and pervasive prosecutorial misconduct.
STANDARD OF REVIEW.

Defendant must demonstrate that the

prosecutor's misconduct constituted

plain error.

State v.

Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, (Utah App. 1991).
4.

Whether the trial court committed reversible error in

failing to declare a mistrial after the jury admitted to using nonrecord evidence during its deliberation upon the verdict.
STANDARD OF REVIEW.

This should be reviewed pursuant to a

"plain error" inquiry.
5.

Whether the defendant was denied effective assistance of

counsel that was guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
3

STANDARD

OF

REVIEW,

Whether

the

defendant

was

denied

effective assistance of counsel as -\ natter of law.
*

i the tri a J court, cumin

*.-.

bb

• "Oi" in receiving

evidence which was irrelevant, immaterial, and prejudicial to Mr.
McGrath '<" eviso •*
STANDARD OF REVIEW,

The court must

re v i cw 1 h is i S M M - »; i

determine if the trial court abused its discretion In admitting the
e*. .'. •.

.

7

:he trial court commit reversible error incorrectly

charging the jury?
STANDARD OF REVIEW.

This issue should he reviewed pursiniit to

a "plain error" inquiry.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE
OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is an appeal from the Third Judicial Distri ct Coi n: t i i I
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, wherein Appellant was
convicted
felony.

I The! 1 I jy Ueceiving Stolen Property, a second degree

Appellant was sentenced to a term of one to fi fteen years,

said sentence to i un concurrently with any sentence Appellant was
serving

t t::i me

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant's parole on an earlier conviction was violated, and
he was taken into custody on February 21, 1991.

He was later

charged by Information with possession of a deadly weapon and theft
by receiving. A pre-revocation hearing was held at the Utah Board
of Pardons, and Defendant was held in prison pending adjudication
of the aforesaid charges.

On March 4, 1991, Defendant filed a

notice and request for disposition of pending charges with the
warden of the Utah State Prison.
2f

(R.O.A. 82, 302-307)

On August

1991, the criminal information was filed against Defendant

(R.O.A. 8)

On February 6, 1992, Defendant filed a motion to

dismiss the information claiming its prosecution was barred by Utah
Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1953 as amended).

(R.O.A. 80)

1992, Judge Richard H. Moffat denied said Motion.

On March 10,
(R.O.A. 100-

101).
Defendant was bound over to District court on a single count
of theft by receiving. All other charges lodged against Defendant
were quashed at the preliminary hearing stage.

(R.O.A. 293).

At trial, Glenda Steadman was called as a witness by the
prosecution.

(Tr. June 1, 1992, pp.134-158).

Her testimony at

trial was different from an interview that she had previously given
to police. The police interview was introduced by the prosecution,
over objection of defendant's counsel, for impeachment purposes.
5

It was argued by defendant's counsel that such impeachment evidence
was inadmissible -

trial

irposes in that it could not. be used as

substantive evidence, a^-i w^s tota:-y irrelevant to the
prosecutor,

in

hif

evidence ii,\. -

denied the objection.

j

argued

the

impeachment
(Tr. June 3,

Defendant's counsel objected, and the court
(Tr. June 1, 1992, p.48).

t i i a I , MMi.u'ted

Steadman'

argument,

• - !•? subs ta titiv*^ evidence.

1992, p.26, p.28),

At

closing

rase

i ujties

MI

1 i rins-.r r i fit

il he

ni

i; I pnd

earlier telephone call with police were given to the

>

taken

w trie taped conversation. These writers • opies were
^f *-he jurors into the jury

deliberations, even though they were not received into evidence.
(Tr

J une

mistrial

defendant's counsel moved for a
- . June

. i **

*.

The moti on was denied.

(Tr

June 3, 1992, p,4:n .
One Co ft1 y K M nil

J

was

* "-

Martha Vert, and her sister, Tiffany Vert, as *

i

mother,

- ir

visited

her home January 28, 1991, tn look «it i marquis cut diamond ring,
and who was

carr y i n<j «i

• 1i«:< 111 <

,

?:-«te pi (i a n i <;i" a I sc >

identified Corey Brooks as the man who returned tc her home when
she was a 1 one the next morning, January 29, 1991, with the same
radio, who was wearing "rainbow" sunglasses, pointed an aulomatin
pistol at her, handcuffed her to the pipes In the bathroom, went

through the house taking all the jewelry, and spoke on the radio to
some other person shortly before leaving the home.

(Tr. June 1,

1992, p.64-66).
Mark McGrath was identified by Glenda Steadman as the man who
drove Corey Brooks to a store on January 22, 1991, in a red pickup
truck, and gave her $300.00 to buy a pistol there.

(Tr. June 1,

1992, p.137-141).
The witness, Bill Anderson, observed a pickup truck parked a
couple of blocks away from the Vert residence on January 28, 1991.
He observed a man matching the description of Corey Brooks get out
of the pickup, walk down the street to the Vert residence, and
enter the Verts' house the evening Stephanie Vert, her mother and
her sister said Corey Brooks was talking to Stephanie about the
purchase of her diamond ring.

(Tr. June 1, 1992, p.115-116).

Significantly, Mr. Anderson thought that a female remained in the
vehicle on the night in question.
color.

He was unsure of the vehicle's

(R.O.A. 490).

Kim Fisher and Rodney Langenbacker identified Mark McGrath as
the person who was driving Corey Brooks in a red pickup on January
29, 1991. They testified Mark McGrath and Corey Brooks stopped at
the Langenbackers' home, where Corey Brooks showed the witnesses
some jewelry out of an attache case.
77).

(Tr. of June 1, 1992, p.73-

Kim Fisher said that some items in the attache case were
7

items on a 1 i st written by Martha Vert as being jewelry that had
been taken from her Vert home, and, in particular, a marquis cut
diamond ri ng.

Rodney Langenbacker stall «ad t;,naf 1 \r

Brooks acini i ttecl

having committed the robbery after a news account of the robbery
was broadcast <

television.

Corey Brooks gave the Langenbackers

a costume jewelry chain when Rodney told him that the chriin Wii> nut
real gold.

Martha Vert identified the cha i n as part of the jewelry

that; had hp^n •••ito.lon t rom h*»r,
Mi . McGrath was not involved in any discussions about theft or
sale of the jewelry with Kim Fisher or Rodney Langenbacker.
June 1, ] 9 9 2 , p. 7 5 , 1 1 , ] 6 2 4

'

prove at tri a ] was the following:

• -: •

(Tr.
* i i i H :I 1 IO

Although Mark McGrath was not

seen and identified as being at the Vert house January 29, 1991,
when Corey Brooks entered the house and commit- McGrath
1,1

was

identified

as

being

present

• •

during

• r>ei y „ Mai k
all

other

s i q n i ti < ant; incidents in preparation I'or the robbery and after the

robbery for the sale of the jewelry."
Defendant was represented by Mr.
Law„, at t:l: le tri a] be] ow•
before

the

jury

tending

Gilbert Athay, Attorney at
•-

^

indicate

previously been convicted of a crime.
asked

j

tha:

evidence came
-.:.<-. defendant

had

Thereafter, the defendant

si an<J i n hi s DWI i belia] f

He i u: ider stood

that the only reason to keep him, off the witness stand would be to
8

avoid an inquiry about his prior criminal history. Mr. Athay told
the defendant that he would "walk out on him," or words to that
effect, if the defendant chose to take the witness stand. Fearing
that he would not have counsel for the remainder of the trial, the
defendant elected not to testify in his own behalf.

He was

convicted.
In the course of the trial, Mr. Athay permitted numerous items
of highly prejudicial and/or inadmissible evidence to come before
the jury, without objection.

The prosecution remarked in opening

statements that the victim of the crime alleged had been held at
gunpoint and handcuffed to the pipes in her bathroom.

These

circumstances were wholly irrelevant to defendant's trial, but
highly prejudicial within the meaning of Rule 403 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence.

(R.O.A. 422).

Mr. Athay did not object.

The

prosecution referred repeatedly to the fact that a robbery victim,
a young girl, had been handcuffed and held at gunpoint.
423).

(R.O.A.

The prosecution itself admitted that Mr. McGrath was not

involved in the robbery. The prosecutor stated in opening: "There
will be no evidence to show that Mr. McGrath was involved in that
robbery."

(R.O.A. 426).

Mr. Athay still did not object.

The

prosecution testified that, the day before the robbery to which the
prosecution could never connect the defendant, Mr. McGrath had
accompanied Glenda Steadman to a pawn shop to purchase a firearm,
9

and that he had been in Corey Brooks Company.

This was totally

irrelevant to the action pending against the defendant, but highly
prejudicial.

(R.O.A. 424). Again, Mr. Athay did not object.

In the direct examination, of the state's witness, Stephanie
Vert, the prosecution examined the victim of the robbery, Ms. Vert,
and showed her State's proposed exhibit number 6, purportedly the
gun used to hold her during the robbery.

(R.O.A. 436). He had Ms.

Vert testify to the highly prejudicial but irrelevant fact that the
witness had been held at gunpoint and handcuffed to the bathroom
pipes underneath the sink in her basement.

(R.O.A. 436-437).

Again, Mr. Athay did not object.
The prosecution inquired of witnesses Rodney Langenbacker and
Kim Fisher about a news broadcast regarding the robbery in which
the

defendant

was

not

involved.

(R.O.A.

445,

461).

The

information regarding the news broadcast about the robbery was
highly prejudicial and irrelevant to the trial of the defendant.
Mr. Athay did not object.
In the prosecution's case against the defendant here, the
prosecution examined the witness, Mr. Langenbacker, about receiving
jewelry from one Corey Brooks, an incident in which Mr. McGrath was
not involved.

The receipt of stolen jewelry by Mr. Langenbacker

from Corey Brooks was totally irrelevant to the trial of this
defendant.

Mr. Athay did not object.
10

(R.O.A. 458).

In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor advised the
jury, without any evidence to support the statement, of the
irrelevant fact that Corey Brooks had already been convicted of
"this crime, that is the robbery."

(R.O.A. 693). Mr. Athay did

not object to this statement, nor move the court for a limiting
instruction, nor ask for a mistrial.
In

the

course

of

the

trial, as

referenced

above, the

prosecution impeached its own witness, Ms. Steadman, with a prior
recorded statement of the witness, which was admissible, if at all,
for impeachment purposes only, and not for the substance contained
within that prior recorded statement.

Mr. Athay objected after,

and only after, the conclusion of the trial and the jury verdict.
(R.O.A. 738).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The court had no jurisdiction to prosecute Mr. McGrath,
because Mr. McGrath was not brought to trial within 120 days
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §77-29-1.
The State put on a prejudicial and irrelevant "aiding and
abetting" case when the charge at issue was theft by receiving.
Defendant did not have effective assistance of counsel,
because his trial counsel sat back and allowed highly prejudicial
and totally irrelevant information regarding a crime committed by
11

another person to come before the jury. When the defendant wanted
to testify in his own behalf in this matter, the defendant did not
do so, under the duress of the threat that his attorney would not
continue to represent him in the trial.
Mr. McGrath's conviction should be reversed because it was not
supported by sufficient evidence.

The only evidence adduced at

trial against Mr. McGrath was to the effect that he had once
accompanied a woman to a pawn shop to purchase a gun, and that he
had been known to be in the company of Corey Brooks, who later
perpetrated a robbery.

No evidence linked Mr. McGrath with the

robbery, or with receiving property taken in the course of the
robbery.
The trial court committed reversible error in failing to
declare a mistrial after the jury admitted to using non-record
"evidence" during its deliberation upon the verdict.
The trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of
a threat allegedly made by defendant to a witness after his arrest.
Evidence

of

the

alleged

threat

was

irrelevant

and

highly

prejudicial.
The trial court

incorrectly

instructed

the

jury at the

commencement of the trial that that the defendant was alleged to
have been armed with a dangerous weapon at the time he committed
the offense in question.

In fact, defendant was not bound over on
12

the weapons charge and no issue of a weapon was before the jury.
However, this improper charge from the judge at the commencement of
trial would cause the jury to assume that any evidence presented at
trial regarding a weapon was somehow relevant to defendant.

This

instruction from the judge prejudiced the jury.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE
DISTRICT
COURT
LACKED
JURISDICTION TO PROSECUTE THIS CASE
BECAUSE MR. McGRATH WAS NOT BROUGHT
TO TRIAL WITHIN 120 DAYS PURSUANT
TO UTAH CODE ANN. §77-29-1.

Under Utah law, an individual who is deprived of his liberty
by means of incarceration in a state penal institution is entitled
to be brought to trial within 120 days of the individual's request
for

a

disposition

of

the

charges

holding

the

individual.

Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 provides that:
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a
term of imprisonment in a state prison, jail
or other penal or correctional institution of
this state, and there is pending against the
prisoner in this state any untried indictment
or information, and the prisoner shall deliver
to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the
same, a written demand specifying the nature
of the charge and the court wherein it is
pending and requesting disposition of the
pending charge, he shall be entitled to have
the charge brought to trial within 120 days of
the date of delivery of written notice.
13

(2)
Any warden, sheriff or custodial
officer, upon receipt of the demand described
in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the
demand to be forwarded by personal delivery or
certified mail, return receipt requested, to
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court
clerk.
The warden, sheriff or custodial
officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting
attorney so notified, provide the attorney
with such information concerning the term of
commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall
be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as
required in Subsection (1), the prosecuting
attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for
good cause shown in open court, with the
prisoner or his counsel being present, may be
granted any reasonable continuance.
(4)
In the event the charge is not
brought to trial within 120 days, or within
such continuance as has been granted, and
defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the
action, the court shall review the proceeding.
If the court finds that the failure of the
prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard
within the time required is not supported by
good cause, whether a previous motion for
continuance was made or not, the court shall
order the matter dismissed with prejudice.
This statutory provision has been interpreted on numerous
occasions by the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals.
In State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme
Court stressed that § 77-29-1 "clearly places the burden of
complying with the statute on the prosecutor." Id. at 424. Since
the prosecutor did not meet his obligation of due diligence in the
Petersen case, the Utah Supreme Court reversed Mr. Petersen's
14

conviction and dismissed all charges brought against him because
Mr. Petersen had not been afforded a trial within 120 days of his
written notice of disposition.

In reaching this conclusion, the

Utah Supreme Court held that:
nothing in Section 77-29-1, its
predecessor, or any of the case law under
either statute requires a showing of prejudice
in order for the charges against the defendant
to be dismissed. On the contrary, Section 7729-1 clearly provides that if there is not
good cause for the delay [in bringing the
defendant to trial within 120 days] the court
shall order the matter dismissed
[Further,] it is clear from the record that
neither of the attorneys nor defendant
requested or was granted a continuance.
The rationale supporting the reversal and the dismissal of
charges in Petersen mandates the same result in the present case.
In this case, the defendant filed a notice and request for
disposition of pending charges on March 4, 1991. This notice was
sent to prosecutors for Salt Lake County, Utah and West Valley
City, Utah.

The defendant called this matter to the court's

attention at his arraignment and first appearance before Judge
Moffat. At his arraignment on January 10, 1992, the defendant told
Judge Moffat that he had filed a 120 day disposition and challenged
the court's jurisdiction.

(R.O.A. 293, 11.14-25).

The defendant

did not come to trial until June 1992, almost fifteen months after
he submitted the notice and request for disposition, and almost ten
months after the filing of the Information, all well past the 120-

day limit mandated by statute.

The rationale set forth in

Petersenf supraf mandates a reversal of the lower court's ruling
and a dismissal of the charges against Mr. McGrath.

POINT II. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF THE CRIME
OF THEFT BY RECEIVING AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
A.

In a Prosecution for Theft by Receiving, the
State Put on an Immaterial Aiding and Abetting
Case.

The trial court allowed the State to put on a largely
irrelevant "aiding and abetting" theft case even though the crime
bound over to District Court was theft by receiving.

Ironically,

the "aiding and abetting" case was quashed at the preliminary
hearing, but the prosecution nevertheless chose to (and was allowed
to) try the quashed charge in the District Court trial.
The prosecution spent the vast majority of its trial time
introducing to the jury evidence that one Corey Brooks had robbed
a home in Salt Lake County, had held a resident in the home at
gunpoint, had handcuffed her to the pipes in her basement, and had
taken property from the victims of this robbery. The prosecution,
in its own opening statement, admitted that it had absolutely no
evidence linking the defendant, Mr. McGrath, with the robbery.
Next, the prosecution established that Corey Brooks took
16

certain items taken in the robbery, and presented them to two
witnesses, Kim Fisher and Rodney Langenbacker.

Mr. Langenbacker

and Ms. Fisher specifically testified that Mr. McGrath was not
present when the items were offered to them, had nothing to do with
offering the items for sale, and was merely present with Corey
Brooks. Absolutely no one testifying in behalf of the prosecution
placed the stolen property in the hands of the defendant.
There is not sufficient evidence against the defendant to pass
constitutional muster. The defendant cannot have been found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter of law upon the status of the
evidence adduced at trial. The burden was effectively shifted to
defendant to come up with an excuse for why he was seen with Corey
Brooks.

POINT III. MR. McGRATH#S CONVICTION SHOULD BE
REVERSED BECAUSE HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR
TRIAL WAS SERIOUSLY PREJUDICED BY
EXTENSIVE AND PERVASIVE PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT.
Both the United States and Utah Constitutions guarantee an
accused the fundamental right to a fair trial.

Amendment XIV,

United States Constitution; Article I, Section 7 and 12, Utah
Constitution. Prosecutors in this state and across the country are
charged with the special duty of insuring that criminal defendants
receive a fair trial.

In the words of the Utah Supreme Court:
17

We
have
previously
stated
that
the
[prosecutor] while charged with vigorously
enforcing the laws has the duty to not only
secure appropriate convictions but an even
higher duty to see that justice is done. In
his role as the State's representative in
criminal matters, the prosecutor, therefore,
must not only attempt to win cases, but must
see that justice is done.
Thus, while he
should prosecute with earnestness and vigor,
it is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every
means to bring about a just one.
Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981).
A corresponding and long-standing precept of Anglo-American
jurisprudence insists that prosecutors must not employ arguments
calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury, nor
direct the jurors away from their duty to decide the case on
anything other than the evidence before them.

Berger v. United

States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935); see also ABA Standards of Criminal
Justice 3-5.8(c) and (d), 3-6.1(3) (2nd ed. 1980), Model Rules of
Professional

Conductf Rule

3.4(e);

and

Code

of

Professional

Responsibility, DR7-106(c)(7).
The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct also indicate that
prosecutors are expected to conduct themselves in an ethical and
decorous manner.

Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8 provides, "A

prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not
simply that of an advocate."

Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4

provides in part, "A lawyer shall not . . . (e) In trial, allude to

any

matter

that

the

lawyer

does

not

reasonably

believe

is

relevant." (Emphasis added.)
In the present case, the prosecutor violated Rule 3.4 and
seriously prejudiced Mr- McGrath's right to a fair trial when he
(1) referred

repeatedly

to

patently

inadmissible

but highly

inflammatory evidence, and (2) used evidence impeaching his own
witness as though it was substantive testimony.
The Utah Supreme Court has established a two-prong test for
gauging the impropriety
prosecutor's remarks.

of

(and reversal necessitated

by) a

State v. Valdez. 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973);

State v. Troy. 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984); State v. Johnson. 663
P. 2d 48 (Utah 1983), overruled on other grounds in State v.
Roberts, 711 P.2d 235,239 (Utah 1985); State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d
750 (Utah 1982); State v. Gaxiolar 550 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1976).
The test of whether the remarks made by
counsel are so objectionable as to merit a
reversal in a criminal case is, [1] did the
remarks call to the attention of the jurors
matters which they would not be justified in
considering their verdict, and [2] were they,
under the circumstances of the particular
case, probably influenced by those remarks.
Valdez. 513 P.2d at 426.

See also State v. Palmer. 218 Utah Adv.

Rep. 19 (Utah App. 1993).

Applying this test to the facts of this

case demonstrates the reversible error was committed
prosecutor and the trial court.
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by the

Given the conflicting and tenuous nature of the evidence here,
it is more likely that the jury was swayed by the prosecutor's
improper statements:
If the conclusion of the jurors is based on
their weighing
conflicting
evidence or
evidence
susceptible
of
differing
interpretations, there is a greater likelihood
that they will be improperly influenced
through the remarks of counsel. Indeed, in
such cases, the jurors may be searching for
guidance in weighing and interpreting the
evidence. They may be especially susceptible
to influence, and a small degree of influence
may be sufficient to affect the verdict.
Counsel is obligated in such cases to avoid.
as far as possible, any reference to those
matters the jury is not justified in
considering.
Troy

688 P.2d

at 486-87

(emphasis added); accord, State v.

Andreasonr 718 P.2d 400, 402-03 (Utah 1986).

The danger of harm

from prejudicial closing arguments is higher than for other aspects
of the trial because of the close proximity between summation and
the jury's deliberations. Therefore, the burden is on the State to
show beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's misconduct was
not prejudicial under the second prong of the Troy reversal test.
State v. Tarafa. 720 P.2d 1368, 1373 and n.21 (Utah 1986) [citing
Chapman v. CaliforniaP 386 U.S. 18 (1967)]. At least two instances
of constitutional prejudice occurred in this case.
A.
Mr. McGrath's Due Process Right to an
Impartial
Jury
was Undermined
by
the
Prosecutor's Improper Trial Tactics.
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Both the United States and Utah Constitutions guarantee Mr.
McGrath the due process right to be tried by an impartial jury.
Amendment VI, United States Constitution; Article I, Section 12,
Utah Constitution. Mr. McGrath was deprived of this right when the
prosecutor put on an irrelevant and highly prejudicial "aiding and
abetting" theft case.

The prosecutor essentially tried Corey

Brooks for robbery and then coincidentally told the jury that Mr.
McGrath had been hanging around Corey Brooks near the time of the
robbery.

In the present case, the prosecutor's deliberate

reference to immaterial evidence likely undermined the jury's
impartiality. As noted previously, the theme throughout the trial
and the prosecutor's closing was that Mr. McGrath was guilty by
association.

To develop this theme, the prosecutor improperly

delved constantly into irrelevant facts pertinent only to Corey
Brooks' prosecution. Corey Brooks' egregious activities, and even
his gun, were paraded in front of the jurors for the deliberate
purpose of alarming them and tainting Mr. McGrath's prosecution.
Based

on

Ruiz, Andreason

and

Johnson, supra. Mr. McGrath's

conviction should be reversed on the grounds that he was deprived
of his due process right to an impartial jury.
B.
The Prosecutor's Use
Testimony
as
Substantive
Prejudicial Misconduct.

of Impeachment
Evidence
was

Deliberate misrepresentation of facts in evidence during a
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prosecutor's summation can rise to the level of a due process
violation.

United State v. Ruizf 711 F.Supp. 145, 150 (S.D.N.Y

1989), aff'd 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1990).

In State v. Andreason.

718 P. 2d 400 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court reversed a
conviction because of improper argument by the prosecutor:
The jury's attention was clearly called to
matters outside the evidence of the case,
e.g., that defendant's alleged conduct was
"persuasive, " [and] that others were involved
in similar conduct . . . .
What others, i.e., Corey Brooks did or did not do was not in
evidence and was certainly not relevant to defendant's guilt or
innocence.

State v. Johnsonr 663 P.2d at 51.

Consequently, the

jury was not justified in considering the statement.
Id.

at 402 (emphasis added).
C. The Prosecutor's Conduct Constitutes Plain
Error.
Litigants are precluded from asserting a claim on appeal for

the first time unless the trial court committed plain error. State
v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991).
The first requirement for a finding of plain
error is that the error be "plain," i.e., from
our examination of the record, we must be able
to say that it should have been obvious to a
trial court that it was committing error. The
second requirement for finding of plain error
is that the error affect the substantial
rights of the accused, i.e., that the error be
harmful.
State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert denied, 493 U.S.

814, (1989) (cites omitted).

In appropriate cases, the court may

"dispense with the requirement of obviousness so that justice can
be done, as when an error not readily apparent to the court or
counsel proves harmful in retrospect."

Id. at 35, n.8.

The

prosecutor's conduct in this case should be reviewed on appealed
under the plain error doctrine.
i.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Was Plain.

The prosecutor openly stated in closing (1) that appellant
committed theft by receiving when all that was shown was evidence
of Corey Brook's robbery (2) that Corey Brooks was already found
guilty, and (3) that Ms. Steadman's impeachment testimony could be
considered by the jury as substantive evidence.

The trial court

should have recognized that impropriety of these statements and
instructed the jury to disregard the.
In State v. Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Utah April 7,
1992), the prosecutor improperly commented on a prior forgery
conviction and indicated that the defendant was prone to taking
advantage of his family.

The Utah Supreme Court held:

This comment clearly urged the jury to view
Emmett as a person who commits crimes against
his family and to use this characteristic as
evidence that Emmett sodomized his son.
Therefore, the comments are in direct
violation of rules 404 and 609. Given the
clarity of the law in this and the blatant
nature of the prosecutor's statements, it
should have been obvious to the trial court
that the prosecutor's remarks called to the
23

juror's attention matters
justified in considering.

they

were

not

Id. at 35. The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in
criminal matters is at least as fundamental as rules 404 and 609.
See Utah Code Ann § 76-1-501 (1990 Repl. Vol.).

The prosecutor's

misconduct in the instant case is at least as blatant as that in
Emmett.
ii.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Was Harmful.

The

prosecutor's

statements

were

harmful.

The

jury

deliberated for many hours on the question of Mr. McGrath's alleged
complicity in Corey Brooks' crime before rendering a verdict of
guilty.
The United States Supreme court has explicitly held that the
reasonable doubt standard has constitutional ramifications;
Lest there remain any doubt about the
constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt
standard, we explicitly hold that the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constituted the crime with which he is
charged.
Sandstrom v. Montanaf 442 U.S. 510, 520 (1979) (quoting In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, (1970)).
Since the prosecutor cannot prove his comments were harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, see Tarafa, 720 P.2d at 1373, appellant
is entitled to a new trial.
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It has also been recognized that objections may serve to
exaggerate the harm sought to be avoided. Seef e.g., United States
v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 199 (1980), cert denied. 449 U.S. 1113,
(1981) ("no objection is required when the prejudice cannot be
corrected or when objection would exaggerate it") (citing United
States v. Youngf 463 F.2d 934, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States
v. Freeman, 514 F.2d 1314, 1319 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated on
other grounds, 598 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).

This Court itself

has recognized that curative instructions are not always effective.
Peters f 796 P.2d at 712.

Accord, State v. Franks, 445 P.2d 200

(Wash 1968); State v. Claflin. 690 P.2d 1186 (Wash. App. 1984).
Not even appellate judges can be so naive as
really to believe that all twelve jurors
succeeded in performing what Judge L. Hand
aptly called "a mental gymnastic which is
beyond, not only their powers, but anybody
elses." Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006
(2nd Cir. 1932).
United States v. Bozzar 365 F.2d 206, 215 (2nd Cir. 1966).

POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN FAILING TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL
AFTER THE JURY ADMITTED TO USING NON-RECORD
"EVIDENCE" DURING ITS DELIBERATION UPON THE
VERDICT.
As noted in the Statement of Facts above, the prosecution was
allowed to impeach its own witness with a transcript and taperecording of a prior statement inconsistent to the witness's
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statement at trial* The transcript of that in consistent statement
was never admitted as an exhibit at trial, and did not constitute
evidence of any kind at trial, other than for consideration of
impeachment purposes. The trial court specifically ruled that the
"handouts" consisting of the transcript of the tape-recording would
be picked up and would not go into the jury room.

(R.O.A. 686).

Nevertheless, it came to the attention of the court after the
jury

had

started

deliberations

that

the

transcripts

of Ms.

Steadman's conversation had been taken into the jury room, despite
the fact that they did not constitute trial evidence.
described this situation as "unfortunate."

The court

(R.O.A. 731).

The

court acknowledged that it was the trial court's "oversight" that
the trial court did not advise the bailiff that she should not
permit those transcripts in the jury room during the deliberations.
The jury submitted a note, in the course of deliberations, to the
court, inquiring how they should review and treat the transcripts.
Mr. Athay objected to the circumstances under which the jury
was permitted to receive and review the transcript, and moved the
court for a mistrial.

(R.O.A. 731).

The trial court denied the motion for mistrial. (R.O.A. 733).
It was plain error for the trial court to refuse to permit the
transcripts into the jury room during deliberations.

It was

further plain error for the trial court to fail to grant a
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mistrial, after it was discovered that the jury had had highly
prejudicial material not admitted as evidence in the case in the
jury room during deliberation.

POINT V.

DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL.

The defendant raises the argument of ineffective assistance of
counsel for the first time on appeal. Defendant acknowledges that
an appellant typically cannot raise an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim for the first time on appeal due to the fact that the
trial record is insufficient to allow the claim to be determined by
the appellate court.

See State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 953

(Ut. App., 1993). See also State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027# 1029
(Utah, 1991).

This claim can be raised, however, if the trial

record is adequate in order to permit determination of the issue by
the appellate court and where there is new counsel on appeal. Id.r
State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Ut. App., 1991).

The trial

record in this instance is adequate in order to permit such review
and determination.
counsel.

Further, the defendant is represented by new

It is appropriate for this Court to reach the merits of

the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The defendant's denial of effective assistance resulted in
part from trial counsel's failure to permit defendant to testify at
the time of trial.

Defendant told his counsel that he wanted to
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testify and inform the jury where he was, physically, at the time
of the crime.

He also wanted to tell the jury that he was merely

giving a ride to Corey Brooks, rather than actively involved in any
illegal activity.

Further, the failure on the part of defense

counsel to allow defendant to testify was exacerbated by the fact
that his counsel told him that he would withdraw as counsel if he
insisted on testifying. Defendant felt coerced into not testifying
and was unable to provide appropriate alibi testimony.

(See

affidavit of Mark Edward McGrath, which is attached hereto and
incorporated herein by reference and designated as appendix "A.")
The United States Supreme Court has set forth a "two prong"
analytical framework for evaluating ineffective assistance of
counsel claims brought under the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

In order for the defendant's Sixth Amendment

challenge to succeed, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient.

This requires a showing that counsel

made an error so serious that counsel was not functioning as
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second,
the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense. This requires a showing that counsel's errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.
1993), at 354.

State v. Snyder. 860 P.2d 351 (Utah App.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, at 687,
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(1984).

The United States Supreme Court has also stated in

Strickland that a defendant must overcome "a strong presumption
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance."
This Court should find as a matter of law that the defendant's
trial counsel's performance was clearly deficient.

Defendant's

counsel may have wanted to prevent defendant's testimony in order
to avoid admission of prior convictions, but those admissions may
have already been known to the jury and would have been offset by
the alibi testimony and deiendant's explanation of his whereabouts
and lack of involvement. Certainly, defendant's counsel's decision
was not reasonable trial strategy.
Defendant acknowledges that this Court must be deferential in
its review of trial counsel's performance so that it does not
"second guess" counsel's actions based on a lifeless record. State
v. Tennyson. 850 P.2d 461, 466, (Utah App. 1993).

However, the

Utah Supreme Court has also acknowledged the importance of a
defendant's right to testify and provide alibi evidence. See State
v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986).

Defendant's counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
when he threatened to withdraw as defendant's counsel if defendant
insisted on his right to provide alibi testimony and testify on his
own behalf.

Defendant's counsel's threats, which did prevent
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defendant from testifying, were a breach of counsel's duty of
loyalty to defendant under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and that abandonment of duty constitutes ineffective
assistance.

(See State v. Holland. 230 U.A.R. 18 (Utah 1994).

Counsel's omission in failing to allow defendant to testify and
counsel's affirmative act in threatening to withdraw fall well
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.
Strickland. 466 U.S., at 690, State v. Frame. 723 P.2d 401 (Utah
1986).
The second prong of the "two prong" test of Strickland
requires

that

the

defendant

prejudiced his defense.

show

the

deficient

performance

However, if counsel's performance is

clearly deficient and prejudice cannot be determined from the
record, a remand is appropriate.

See, for example, State v.

Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 858-59 (Utah App. 1992), cert, den., 853
P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
Further, there is a "reasonable probability" that, but for
counsel's errors, the result at the trial level would have been
different.

Strickland,. 466 U.S. at 694; Frame, 723 P.2d at 405.

"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
competency and reliability of the verdict."

Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 694; Frame, 723 P.2d at 405.
A somewhat similar but less egregious fact situation occurred
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previously and was addressed by this court in the matter of State
v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1988).

In that case, the

defendant appealed his conviction of aggravated arson based upon
ineffective assistance of counsel.

One of the specific omissions

that defendant claimed was prejudicial was that the defendant's
counsel did not understand a rule of evidence and thereby prevented
the defendant from testifying in his own behalf. Defendant claimed
that he could explain his whereabouts prior to the first fire which
occurred.

In analyzing the facts of the case, the court in

Morehouse explained that the focus of the prosecution was on the
second fire rather than the first fire and that, also, several
witnesses testified at trial as to the defendant's movements and
whereabouts.

Further, had the defendant testified he would have

been subject to cross examination of the evidence given by those
witnesses and inconsistencies in statements would have developed.
Further, the court stated that the jury would have been told, at
the very least, that he had previously been convicted of a felony.
Morehouse, at 219-220. In that case, the defendant did have a long
criminal record involving convictions for several felonies and two
prior incarcerations.

Pursuant to Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of

Evidence, prior convictions may be elicited to attack credibility
in certain instances.

In Morehouse, the court determined that it

was "difficult to see how the defendant's failure to testify leads
31

to a reasonable probability that the result would have been
different.

Again, counsel's decision

falls within the wide

latitude of legitimate trial tactics." Id. at 220. In Morehousef
however, there was no act on the part of defendant's counsel to
affirmatively threaten to withdraw as counsel if defendant failed
to abide by his recommendations. Further, Justice Jackson, in his
dissent, properly analyzed the representation of the trial counsel
and determined that it was demonstrably incompetent. Morehouse, at
222.

Justice Jackson refers to the fact that the defendant's

counsel in that case admitted his legal error in misunderstanding
the applicable rules of evidence, Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 609,
and its effect on the defendant in that case. Morehouse, at 221.
Given that the defendant in that case could tell the jury where he
was and what he was doing at the time of the initial fire and that
only he could share with the jury this first person account, it was
Justice Jackson reasoned decision that his attorney deprived him of
his constitutional right to testify.

Morehouse, at 220. Justice

Jackson went on to analyze whether the deficiency of counsel was
prejudicial to appellant and concluded that there was a reasonable
probability that the jury verdict would have been different if
counsel had competently understood the rules of evidence and not
kept the defendant from testifying.

Morehousef at 223.

In the instant case, the defendant could provide credible
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alibi testimony as well as an explanation of why he was where he
was at the time of the incident, during periods of preparation for
the robbery and after the robbery.

The jury would not, in all

probability, have convicted the defendant absent the failures and
omissions of defendant's counsel. It is clear from the face of the
record that defendant's counsel's actions were prejudicial to the
defendant.

Defendant has met both prongs of the Strickland test.

Defendant's conviction should be reversed and the case remanded for
a new trial.
Setting aside the issue of the defendant's trial counsel's
actions in preventing the defendant from testifying, defendant's
trial counsel still did not render effective assistance of counsel
in the trial court.

Specifically, as noted in the Statement of

Facts above, defendant's counsel permitted prosecution to present
highly prejudicial and totally irrelevant evidence, regarding a
violent and disturbing crime of a third party, Mr. Corey Brooks, to
the jury. The jury heard repeatedly that the victim of Mr. Brooks'
robbery, a sympathetic young woman, had been held at gunpoint and
handcuffed to the pipes in her basement.

The jury even saw the

weapon purported to be the weapon used in that offense.
prosecutor alluded to this robbery repeatedly.

The

The prosecutor

elicited testimony from two witnesses about a news report regarding
the robbery, and the fact that the news report was broadcast in
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their home at about the time Mr. McGrath was seen in the company of
Corey

Brooks.

The prosecutor adduced testimony

from Glenda

Steadman that Mr. McGrath had accompanied her when she bought a
handgun.

Finally, the prosecution eventually referred to the

robbery at trial before the jury, "this crime" as "the robbery."
In other words, the prosecution led the jury to believe that the
crime to be considered by the jury was the robbery, and not theft
by receiving.
All of this evidence came in over the course of three days of
trial without a single objection from defendant's counsel to the
relevancy of the evidence under Rules 401 and 402 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence, or to the prejudicial effect of this evidence,
pursuant to Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

Clearly,

counsel's failure to object to these repeated references, to the
robbery, the gun and the news broadcast, and other conduct of Corey
Brooks, falls below any objective standard for performance of trial
counsel

in a criminal

case.

It meets the

first prong of

Strickland,, supra.
Further, it is clear that all of this evidence prejudiced the
trial of the defendant in the trial court.

Defendant's counsel

permitted the prosecution to try Mr. Brooks for robbery and not to
try Mr. McGrath for receiving stolen property. Had the prosecution
been held to the crime charged and the defendant on trial, the
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outcome at trial may well have been a verdict of not guilty.

POINT VI. DID
THE
TRIAL
COURT
COMMIT
REVERSIBLE
ERROR
IN
RECEIVING
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS
IRRELEVANT,
IMMATERIAL AND HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL TO
MR. McGRATH'S CASE?
During the course of the trial, the jury heard the testimony
of Glenda Steadman. Eventually, Ms. Steadman was permitted by the
trial court to testify that she had been threatened by the
defendant after his arrest for the charge at issue.

(R.O.A. 470).

This testimony occurred over the repeated objection of defendant's
trial counsel.

(R.O.A. 470).

Testimony that the defendant had allegedly made the threats to
claimed the witness as was wholly irrelevant to the question of the
defendants guilt or innocence of theft by receiving.
Evidence 402).

(Rules of

Even if it was relevant, it was so prejudicial as

not to be admissible in the trial court, pursuant to Rule 403 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence. Nonetheless, the trial court permitted
evidence of this alleged threat to come before the jury.

This

constituted an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
State v. Maurer. 770 P.2d 981 (Utah 1989).

POINT VII.

DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE
ERROR INCORRECTLY CHARGING THE JURY?

The trial court, in advising the jury at the outset of the
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case of the charges pending against the defendant, stated as
follows:
" . . . in that the defendant, Mark Edward
McGrath, a party to the offense, received,
retained or disposed of property, aided in
concealing, selling
or withholding
the
property of Stephanie Vert, knowing that the
property had been stolen or believing that it
probably had been stolen and/or concealed,
sold or withheld the property of Stephanie
Vert, knowing the property had been stolen
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof
and that at the time of the theft, Mark Edward
McGrath was armed with a dangerous weapon, to
wit: a gun, and that the value of said
property exceeded $1,000.00 to which the
defendant has plead not guilty."
(R.O.A.
416).
In reading this information to the jury, the judge confused
charges which had been bound over for prosecution after the
preliminary hearing with those which had not been bound over.
Effectively, the judge admonished the jury at the outset that this
case somehow involved Mark Edward McGrath's alleged use of a
dangerous weapon in the course of a theft or robbery. In fact, Mr.
McGrath had been bound over for receiving stolen property, a second
degree felony.
The

court

He was not bound over on any gun count.
committed

plain

error,

by

instructing

and

admonishing the jury at the very outset of the trial that the issue
of Mr. McGrath's alleged possession of a weapon or use of a weapon
was in any way involved in this case.
confused about this issue.

Obviously, the jury was

The jury submitted a question to the

court about how to respond to this jury charge • A true and correct
copy of that jury question is attached as Appendix "B," and is
found at 182 of the R.O.A.
It is clear that this is of more serious concern when one
considers the prosecution's repeated efforts, later in the case, to
link defendant McGrath to the robbery committed by Corey Brooks,
merely by association with Corey Brooks.

CONCLUSION

Defendant alleges that this Court must dismiss the charges
against him under Utah Code Ann., §77-29-1 (1953 as amended).

In

the alternative, appellant respectfully requests that this Court
reverse his conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this

day of April, 1994.
CORPORON & WILLIAMS

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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I hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered seven
copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South 500
East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and two copies to the
JAN GRAHAM, Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114, this

day of April, 1994•
CORPORON & WILLIAMS

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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MARY C. CORPORON, #734
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
310 South Main, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-1162
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT

Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 92049-CA

-vsMARK EDWARD McGRATH,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:ss
)

I, MARK EDWARD McGRATH, being first duly sworn upon oath,
hereby depose and state as follows:
1.

Affiant is the defendant/appellant to the above-entitled

action, and is over the age of twenty-one years.
2.

Affiant, in preparation for trial, and at the time of

trial, informed his counsel that he wanted to testify.
counsel told him not to testify.

Affiant's

Affiant wanted to tell the jury

where he was at the time of the crime. He also wanted to tell the
jury that he was merely giving Corey Brooks a ride and had no
involvement with the criminal activity.

Affiant had numerous

receipts and other documents indicating where he was at the given
times which could have been admitted to evidence

if he

had

testified*
3.

Affiant and his counsel had numerous arguments about

whether it was appropriate for affiant to testify.

Discussions

were had not only with his counsel, but with his family. The
discussions culminated at the time of trial. Affiant insisted to
his counsel that he wished to testify. Affiant's counsel said that
he would "walk" if affiant insisted on testifying.
felt very coerced into not testifying.

The affiant

It was his counsel's

threats to withdraw if he insisted on testifying that finally
resulted in his decision not to testify, based upon his fears of
being abandoned by counsel.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.

^<

x/'Ji4-

MARK EDWARD McGRATH
Defendant/Appellant
ON THE

Vy

day of April, 1994, personally appeared

before me, the undersigned notary, MARK EDWARD McGRATH, the signer
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT, who duly acknowledged to me that he
signed the same voluntarily and for its stated purpose.
"""NotaJyPuWc
KAREN^GULDNER
310 South Main #1400
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